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Since two decades, neuroenhancement is a major topic in neuroethics and still receives
much attention in the scholarly literature as well as in public media. In contrast to
high hopes at the beginning of the “Decade of the Brain” in the United States and
Europe that we subsume under the “pharmacological optimism hypothesis,” recent
evidence from clinical neuroscience suggests that developing drugs that make healthy
people smarter is even more difficult than finding new treatments for patients with
mental disorders. However, cognitive enhancing drugs even for patients with impaired
intellectual performance have not been successfully developed yet and new drugs that
might have a disruptive impact on this field are unlikely to be developed in the near future.
Additionally, we discuss theoretical, empirical, and historical evidence to assess whether
cognitive enhancement of the healthy is common or even epidemic and if its application
will further increase in the near future, as suggested by the “neuroenhancement
prevalence hypothesis.” Reports, surveys, and reviews from the 1930s until today
indicate that psychopharmacological neuroenhancement is a fact but less common than
often stated, particularly in the public media. Non-medical use of psychostimulants for
the purpose of cognitive enhancement exists since at least 80 years and it might actually
have been more common in the past than today. Therefore, we conclude that the
pharmacological optimism hypothesis and neuroenhancement prevalence hypotheses
have to be rejected and argue that the neuroenhancement debate should take the
available evidence more into account.
Keywords: smart drugs, study drugs, cognitive enhancement, neuroenhancement, stimulants, modafinil,
methylphenidate, amphetamine
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, scientists, ethicists, and legal scholars
debate the issue of neuroenhancement – the improvement of
healthy people’s cognitive functioning on the neural level, for
example by psychopharmacological means (Whitehouse et al.,
1997; Farah et al., 2004). Other possible strategies, such as
brain stimulation or genetic modification, are presently being
investigated and discussed as well (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2011).
However, because of the higher prevalence and longer history of
psychopharmacological approaches, we focus on stimulant drugs
in the present paper, particularly methylphenidate, modafinil,
and amphetamine. The scholarly interest in neuroenhancement
has steadily increased since the 1990s, as reflected by the number
of annual publications (Figure 1). It is also a revenant topic
in the media communication about brain research: The broad
public or at least the decision-makers of the popular press
address “brain optimization” even more frequently than mental
disorders (O’Connor et al., 2012). The vast majority of such
reports describes neuroenhancement as common, increasing, or
both (Partridge et al., 2011), but we also noted many scientific
publications doing so (Quednow, 2010; Schleim, 2010; Schleim
and Quednow, 2017).
The sustained enthusiasm about and interest in
pharmacological neuroenhancement is frequently based on
three assumptions, (1) that intellectual performance can
putatively be improved by drugs, (2) that pharmacological
neuroenhancement is already done commonly by healthy
people, and (3) that it will be used increasingly in the future.
If neuroenhancement were impossible, at least in the short- to
mid-term, or if almost nobody used drugs for such purposes,
the debate would probably lose much of its public relevance,
although there would be still other ethical issues for discussion.
We would like to coin the first assumption the “pharmacological
optimism hypothesis” and summarize the two latter ones to the
“neuroenhancement prevalence hypothesis.” With theoretical
considerations, reviewing recent surveys on prevalence of
neuroenhancement including historical evidence from Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States, we will
assess both hypotheses in this paper to provide a better evidence
base for the ethical neuroenhancement debate.
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL OPTIMISM
HYPOTHESIS
Essential support for our arguments is coming from the so-
called funding crisis in psychopharmacology that arose in ca.
20101 and from past and current reports on the consumption
patterns of psychostimulant users and the low prevalence of
their use as neuroenhancers. Optimistic expectations to find
better treatments for neurodegenerative or psychiatric disorders
were central to the “Decade of the Brain” proclaimed by the
1For example, nature news featured “Psychopharmacology in crisis” in June
2011 (http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110614/full/news.2011.367.html). We
will address more scholarly sources below.
U.S. Government and the European Commission (Bush, 1990;
Pandolfi, 1993), but also to influential political initiatives that
prioritized funding of that research area. The German manifesto
on the future of brain research published by eleven influential
neuroscientists (Monyer et al., 2004) and the Human Brain
Project2, funded by the European Research council since 2013,
are further examples for the confidence regarding new treatments
developed by clinical neuroscience. Similarly, a major aim of the
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (DSM-5) of
the American Psychiatric Association published in 2013 was the
discovery of neuroscientific biomarkers that are reliable targets
particularly in the brain or genome for diagnosis and treatment
of psychiatric disorders (Kupfer et al., 2002; Hyman, 2007). In
spite of these efforts and an unprecedented increase in scientific
publications and knowledge, the high expectations in terms of
translations to clinical applications were not met yet (Schleim
and Roiser, 2009; Schleim, 2014a; Frisch, 2016). The failure to
discover even a single reliable biomarker for any of the hundreds
of DSM-5 classifications lead to the introduction of a new
research paradigm, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), whose
scientific superiority remains unclear at the present moment
(Kirmayer and Crafa, 2014).
In accordance with the high expectations of the 1990s
and early 2000s regarding clinical neuroscience, the
neuroenhancement literature was optimistic that new drugs
for dementia or attention disorders could also be used for
improving cognitive functioning in healthy people (Whitehouse
et al., 1997; Farah et al., 2004). In contrast to these hopes, the
funding crisis of psychopharmacology became evident around
2010: On the one hand, governmental changes in the funding
structures of many countries made scientists in this area more
dependent on collaborations with the pharmaceutical industry
(Stanford, 2008; Hendrie, 2010). On the other hand, a lot of
pharmaceutical companies closed their respective laboratories
and rather invested in other fields because of the lack of
successes of newly developed compounds resulting in high
business risks regarding the introduction of new medications
(Miller, 2010; Nutt and Goodwin, 2011; van Gerven and Cohen,
2011).
From this perspective it is not surprising that a major part of
the psychopharmacological neuroenhancement literature (Smith
and Farah, 2011; Weyandt et al., 2013; Busardo et al., 2016) covers
well-known stimulant drugs that have been discovered a long
time ago, like amphetamine, already synthesized at the end of
the 19th century, methylphenidate, a discovery of the 1940s, and
modafinil, synthesized in the 1970s. All of these drugs were or
are still prescribed for some psychiatric indications with some
differences between countries related to, e.g., the substances’
abuse potential.3 However, that the molecules have been known
and investigated for a long time does not mean that they do
not pose scientific challenges any more. Amphetamine, by far
the oldest of the three compounds, still keeps scientists busy
2https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/
3For a comparison of legislations within Europe, see information provided by the
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction http://www.emcdda.
europa.eu/html.cfm/index146601EN.html
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FIGURE 1 | Annual publications on enhancement have grown steadily since the early 1990s (yellow line, right axis), in parallel to the annual production quotas of
methylphenidate (blue bars) and amphetamine (red bars; both left axis). “Cognitive enhancement” is by far the most common term with 1,065 hits for the whole
period, followed by “neuroenhancement,” which was mentioned first in 2004, achieving a total of 180 hits so far. Based on data from the ISI Web of Science topic
search for cognitive, affective, mood enhancement, and neuroenhancement as well as the US Drug Enforcement Agency and the US Federal Register.
who want to understand the precise mechanism of action in the
animal and human brain (Sulzer et al., 2005). A recent Cochrane
meta-analysis of the available clinical studies on amphetamine
for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) treatment
found that most trials were at a high risk of bias, provided low
to very low quality evidence, and should be longer in duration
to learn more about long-term side effects of the treatment
(Punja et al., 2016). The latter point is of particular interest when
neuroenhancement in the healthy is performed not just for a
particular event, like an exam period, but to increase performance
continuously.
These observations demonstrate that psychopharmacological
research is complex, challenging, and difficult even in the case
of neurological and psychiatric disorders, where the treatment
outcome is clear, such as a reduction of symptom severity
associated with an improvement of social and occupational
functioning. Moreover, the ethical issue of intervening in the
brain chemistry is justified by patients’ suffering, but might
be disputable in healthy people. In the case of cognitive-
emotional disturbances in mental disorders, clinically validated
and reliable neuropsychological tests are available to measure
the treatment’s outcome; however, most of the so far tested
substances have very limited effects on disturbed cognitive
functions in neurological and psychiatric patient populations
(Dekkers and Rikkert, 2007; Chou et al., 2012; de Jongh,
2017). In contrast to these clinical standards, it is much less
clear what the outcome of neuroenhancement in the healthy
would be and how it could be measured. Employing the same
neuropsychological tests as in clinical studies would carry the
risk of the fallacy that what helps patients must also help the
healthy (Schleim, 2014b). That this reasoning is not necessarily
true can be shown with many examples, such as insulin which
is essential for patients with diabetes but would not help and
even harm people without the disease. According to an influential
definition, human enhancement is “[a]ny change in the biology or
psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a
good life in the relevant set of circumstances” (Savulescu et al.,
2011). This could be virtually everything and the meaning of
“a good life” can be expected to strongly vary across people
(Schleim, 2014b). Either way, the evidence is still low that so far
discussed drugs in fact broadly enhance cognitive performance
in the healthy (de Jongh et al., 2008; Quednow, 2010; Wood et al.,
2014). We assume that if the situation of psychopharmacology
were more positive, with a high availability of clinically validated
new treatments for neurological and mental disorders, optimism
concerning psychopharmacological neuroenhancement might
be justified. However, in the present situation we have to
reject the pharmacological optimism hypothesis, which does
not amount to sheer pessimism but rather a pharmacological
realism considering the evidence discussed above (Schleim and
Quednow, 2017).
THE NEUROENHANCEMENT
PREVALENCE HYPOTHESIS
As already summarized in the introduction, public media often
describe ways to improve one’s brain and pharmacological
neuroenhancement as common, increasing, or both (Partridge
et al., 2011; O’Connor et al., 2012). A detailed analysis has
shown that scientific sources are often quoted as evidence for
such statements (Partridge et al., 2011), which is in line with
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our own perception of the scholarly literature. At first glance,
stimulant production figures seem to support this finding: The
aggregate production of methylphenidate and amphetamine
combined in the United States was about 100.000 kg in the 1990s,
500.000 kg in the first decade of the 2000s and already more
than 800.000 kg in the 7 years from 2010 to 2016 (Figure 1).
Thus, the amount deemed sufficient during a whole decade
in the 1990s is surpassed annually since 2013 with 134.000–
146.000 kg of just these two psychostimulants produced per
year. According to the neuroenhancement prevalence hypothesis,
one would expect a similar increase of the prevalence of non-
medical prescription stimulant consumption, for example, on
college or university campuses. In contrast, this is not what
the data show: Although the reported prevalence rates vary
from nearly 0% to more than 30% in individual studies, the
most recent and most comprehensive reviews found that the
methodologically best studies (e.g., comprising the largest and
most representative samples) frequently reported prevalence
rates well below 10% (Smith and Farah, 2011; Weyandt et al.,
2013). Importantly, consumption generally operationalized as
non-medical use often included other motives beyond cognitive
performance enhancement, such as recreational/lifestyle use in
order to have fun, to party, or to lose weight, and often referred
to lifetime or last year prevalence, which does not provide more
information than that users have consumed such substances at
least once during long periods of time. For example, one study,
which reported a lifetime prevalence of 16.2%, found that only
15.5% of this subsample, or 2.5% of the original sample, were
regular users who took prescription stimulants non-medically at
least two or three times per week (White et al., 2006).
One of the first surveys in Germany showed that the lifetime
prevalence of the use of neuroenhancers was only 1.3% in
a large sample of pupils and students (Franke et al., 2011).
A more recent nation-wide survey among students reported
low prevalence rates for specific neuroenhancement use of
prescription drugs (1.7%, methylphenidate, modafinil, or beta
blockers; at least “sometimes”) or illicit drugs (1.3%, e.g., cocaine)
in the Netherlands (Schelle et al., 2015). Similarly, a nation-
wide survey among university students in the United Kingdom
and Ireland reported that 0.8, 3.4, or 0.3% were current users
of methylphenidate, modafinil, or amphetamine, respectively,
for the purpose of neuroenhancement (Singh et al., 2014).
Finally, also in Swiss students the lifetime prevalence rates of
using methylphenidate (3.7%), modafinil (0.3%), amphetamine
(0.4%), and cocaine (0.2%) exclusively for cognitive enhancement
purposes were rather low and clearly non-epidemic (Maier et al.,
2013).
Of course it is debatable how high the percentage of consumers
needs to be to properly speak of a “common” or even “epidemic”
use. However, there is currently no evidence, to our knowledge,
that the numbers have really been increasing in the past 20 years.
The situation is further complicated by different inclusion criteria
(e.g., general non-medical vs. specific neuroenhancement use)
and outcome measures (e.g., once-in-a-lifetime vs. regular use)
of the studies. By contrast, the evidence more likely suggests
that many of the consumers responding positively in the
surveys are young people trying out prescription stimulants for
neuroenhancement or other non-medical and recreational use
just once or only a few times – and then stop doing so (Sussman
et al., 2006; Schleim and Quednow, 2017). It is well known
that college students have a high likelihood of experimenting
with different kinds of illicit drugs and dangerous behaviors
(Dennhardt and Murphy, 2013) but that they usually stop this
behavior when they leave the college (Johnston et al., 2005).
Summarizing all of the above, it is thus highly likely that the
increase in psychostimulant production in the United States
(Figure 1) and many other countries largely reflects an increase
in medical use induced by a change in prescription patterns of
physicians as it was shown for the increase of methylphenidate
production during the 1990s and 2000s in Germany (Ferber
et al., 2001; Schubert et al., 2010). However, such prescriptions
are usually excluded in surveys on the prevalence of non-
medical stimulant use, in accordance with the basic assumption
of the ethical neuroenhancement debate that treatment has
to be distinguished from enhancement (Council on Bioethics,
2003).
In fact, the frequency of diagnosing ADHD for which
methylphenidate and, in some countries, also amphetamine are
commonly prescribed, has been increased since the 1970s and
is estimated to have reached 7.2% of children and adolescents
presently on the basis of a large meta-analysis (Thomas et al.,
2015). The rate of children and adolescents prescribed with
ADHD medication has increased accordingly, approaching 4%
in the Netherlands and the United States, 2% in Denmark and
Germany, but remaining at only 0.5% in the United Kingdom
(Bachmann et al., 2017), partially explaining the increase of
stimulant production seen in Figure 1. In summary, these data
make plausible why we only see an increase of prescription
stimulants in production quotas, but not in surveys investigating
the prevalence of neuroenhancement. Given the high availability
of the drugs because of medical prescriptions, one might have
expected even higher prevalence rates of non-medical use.
For the time being, we consider the presented arguments as
sufficient justification to reject the neuroenhancement prevalence
hypothesis.
HISTORY OF NEUROENHANCEMENT
In addition to this evidence concerning the present situation, we
can also present historical sources to support our arguments even
further. Rasmussen (2008) already has drawn insightful parallels
between medical use of psychostimulants in the early 2000s
and before the 1970s. We identified publications documenting
the use of amphetamine as study drugs, thus non-medically as
neuroenhancement, as early as in the 1930s. For example, an
editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association of
1937 stated that “. . .this information [about the psychological
outcomes of an amphetamine experiment at the University of
Minnesota] was disseminated to the student body by word of
mouth and the drug has been and still is being obtained by
the students from drug stores for the purpose of avoiding sleep
and fatigue when preparing for examinations” (Goodman and
Gilman, 1937). A follow-up editorial a year later contained a
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general warning about the substance and stated that “news that it
could be obtained for keeping one awake while ‘cramming’ for final
examinations spread from campus to campus” (Anon, 1938). The
Dutch physician Meerloo (1937) wrote that three of his patients,
all of them students who had taken amphetamine to study longer
at night, suffered from unwanted side-effects or test anxiety. In
Germany, an experiment carried out in September 1938 with
students at the Military Academy of Berlin is documented in
which placebo, caffeine,and amphetamine were compared when
students learned under conditions of sleep deprivation (Ohler,
2015).
Psychostimulant use for neuroenhancement purposes
occurred even after the “War on Drugs” was proclaimed in
the early 1970s, which introduced harsh punishments for
amphetamine usage: “The occasional use of amphetamine
to remain alert or enhance one’s performance is widespread.
Students cramming for exams, drivers on extended nonstop trips,
athletes attempting to excel, and military personnel on prolonged
operations are some of the groups involved” (Cohen, 1975). We
documented elsewhere that surveys carried out in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s found similar and in some cases even higher
prevalence rates for stimulant consumption than those discussed
above, particularly for amphetamine, including instrumental
use to stay awake and/or to study, thus which would be called
“neuroenhancement” nowadays (Schleim and Quednow, 2017).
The combined historical evidence from the 1930s to the 1980s
makes our case for the rejection of the neuroenhancement
prevalence hypothesis even stronger.
CONCLUSION
Psychopharmacological neuroenhancement – or cognitive
enhancement – exists at least for more than 80 years. Only
the concept is new; and the surge in related publications
documented in Figure 1. But even before the contemporary
debate, some scholars raised ethical and theoretical issues
concerning stimulant consumption long before so-called
“neuroethics” came into existence. Smith and Blachly (1966)
already asked, whether subjects really perform better or just
perceived themselves so, in how far socioeconomic status affects
consumption, why so many students rather consume the drugs
occasionally than regularly, whether medical students are at
a higher risk, or to what extent the practice is influenced by
the pharmaceutical industry. Unfortunately for those patients
who are waiting for better treatments, psychopharmacological
research turned out to be more difficult than suggested during
the very optimistic 1990s and early 2000s in which also the
present ethical neuroenhancement debate has its roots. We have
argued that if it is even challenging to develop new treatments,
then finding drugs which are suitable for improving cognitive
functioning of the healthy with acceptable long-term side-effects
is even more difficult, for theoretical, pharmacological, and
ethical reasons. Therefore we clearly reject the pharmacological
optimism and neuroenhancement prevalence hypotheses as
explained above.
The neuroenhancement debate has been called a “myth”
(Zohny, 2015), a “bubble” (Lucke et al., 2011), and a “phantom
debate” (Quednow, 2010) independently by various authors.
From our perspective, the already common phenomenon of
students’ drug use was re-framed as a new ethical and
epidemiological problem in academic discourses, making use
of exaggerated promises and prevalence rates. We do not say
that scientists, ethicists, or legal scholars should stop debating
neuroenhancement, but that this debate should rest on correct
theoretical, empirical, and historical evidence in order to avoid
unrealistic expectations in the general public (Forlini and Racine,
2009; Forlini and Hall, 2016). Other authors criticized the
repetitiveness of this debate since the 1990s (Brenninkmeijer
and Zwart, 2017). Furthermore, as psychopharmacology is
in a funding crisis, relocation of resources for improving
the already healthy probably would imply further negative
consequences for many patients. Meanwhile, if the modification
of biopsychological factors to improve people’s chances of leading
a good life (Savulescu et al., 2011) turns out to be more difficult
than expected, we propose a shift to the environmental and social
factors affecting people’s well-being as an alternative (Schleim,
2014b).
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